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Competition in the presence of 
aging: dominance, coexistence, 
and alternation between states
Toni Pérez1, Konstantin Klemm1,2,3,4,5 & Víctor M. Eguíluz1
We study the stochastic dynamics of coupled states with transition probabilities depending on local 
persistence, this is, the time since a state has changed. When the system has a preference to adopt 
older states the system orders quickly due to the dominance of old states. When preference for new 
states prevails, the system can show coexistence of states or synchronized collective behavior resulting 
in long ordering times. In this case, the magnetization of the system oscillates around zero. Finally we 
discuss a potential application in social systems.
Models of two states are commonly used in physics as a tool to study the emergence of collective behavior in 
systems from spin interaction to opinion dynamics1–3. In the adoption of traits4–7 different aspects have been 
studied including the relevance of the interaction topology8–10, social influence11,12, and mass media13–15. When 
accounting for opinion dynamics, the majority of models are based on decision rules that consider a fraction of 
the surrounding states, e.g., voter model16, threshold model17, majority rule18, or Sznajd model19.
The timing of the interactions can also affect the behavior of the system at least by two ways: the precise 
sequence of interactions and by the aging of states. For example, in epidemic spreading and diffusion, the tem-
poral sequence of interactions can slow down the spreading process20–23; in ordering dynamics, state-dependent 
updates can have a qualitative impact on the mean time to order24–29. Aging in physical systems refers to the per-
sistence time, that is, the time spent in a given state, and affects the response of the system to an external field or 
perturbation30,31. In social systems, when individuals make choices they usually rely on their own past experience 
or memory32–34. While conservative groups tend to hold ideas in an unaltered form for a long time, progressive 
individuals embrace new opinions, ideas, or a technology and disseminate them with more enthusiasm35,36. In 
the competition between new and old information, although new information is more valuable for exploring and 
spatial searching37, adopting older strategies can promote cooperation and group success38. In the emergence of 
cooperation, the persistence time in the learning of strategies in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma enhances coop-
eration and leads to heterogeneous distributions of persistence times39, and generates cyclic dominance of strat-
egies40. In an evolutionary context, aging at the speciation events has been proposed as a mechanism to explain 
the shape of evolutionary trees41. Another example of the impact of aging can be found in the citation networks, 
where the age of the nodes has a crucial effect in the dynamic of growing of the network42. Finally, in epidemic 
spreading persistence has been introduced in the modeling of the mobility of the agents43,44 and as latency periods 
in the dynamics of infection21,45.
Here we analyze how the tendency of particles towards the adoption of established vs. novel states influences 
the macroscopic dynamics and the ordering process. We tackle this problem by considering a model with ran-
domly chosen pairwise interactions. The adoption of one of the particles’ states depends on their relative age or 
persistence time, that is, the time span each particle has been in its current state. Throughout this work we will 
disregard the lifetime of the particle and we will use the terms young and old to describe, in a pairwise interaction, 
the particle with the smallest and largest persistence time, respectively.
Results
The system is composed by N particles whose dynamic is defined as follows: each particle has a state L that can be 
up (↑ ) or down (↓ ) with age young (Y) or old (Z). Thus, particles can be in four states Y↑, Y↓, Z↑, and Z↓. Young 
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states turn into old states at a rate that we set to r = 1. Then, there are interactions of randomly paired particles: i) 
for young i and old j of opposite states, i adopts the state of j with probability ε= +w
1
2 , otherwise (with proba-
bility 1 − w), j adopts the state of i; ii) for pairs of particles with the same age and different states, each particle has 
probability 1
2
 of convincing the other; iii) for pairs of particles with the same state, nothing happens. When a 
particle adopts a state, the persistence time goes to the young age of the adopted state. Neglecting correlations, the 
expectation values of state fractions evolve according to
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with the normalization y↑ + y↓ + z↑ + z↓ = 1. Here we use y↑↓ and z↑↓ to refer to the fraction of the correspond-
ing states occupied by the particles. The parameter ε corresponds to the persuasiveness of the particle: ε > 0 
means that particles with older states are more persuasive, while for ε < 0, particles with younger states are more 
persuasive.
The system presents three stationary solutions in the relevant range of all four variables being non-negative. 
Two fixed points are the homogeneous solutions S1 having z↓ = 1 and S2 having z↑ = 1. Here either all states are 
down (S1) or all are up (S2) and old. Figure 1(a) shows the Jacobian eigenvalues for these two solutions as a func-
tion of ε. These homogeneous solutions are stable if ε > 0. Non-zero imaginary parts of two eigenvalues are 
obtained for ε  >   1/4. The third fixed point S3 is an up-down-symmetric solution with values 
= = , = =ε
ε
ε
ε
↑ ↓ + −∆ ↑ ↓ − + +∆y y z z5 2
8
5 2
8  where ε ε∆ = + ( + )25 4 3
2 . As shown in Fig. 1(b), S3 is stable 
if ε < 0, thus complementary to the stability of the homogeneous solutions. A transition from zero to non-zero 
imaginary parts of two eigenvalues occurs when ε falls below approximately − 0.39. In this regime of strongly 
Figure 1. Jacobian eigenvalues of the stationary solutions of Eq. (1) as a function of persuasiveness ε for:  
(a) the homogeneous solutions S1 and S2 having the same eigenvalues, and (b) the solution S3. Black solid 
(gray dashed) lines represent real (imaginary) parts of the two complex conjugate eigenvalues. Dotted-dashed 
black line represents the third eigenvalue (real). The fourth eigenvalue (not shown) for the eigenspace in (1, 1, 1, 
1) direction is zero due to conservation of normalization.
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negative ε, the system oscillates when relaxing from a perturbation out of the symmetric fixed point solution S3. 
This stability scenario is qualitatively maintained when r changes. As r → 0, the point at which the non-zero imag-
inary part of the eigenvalues appears shifts towards ε = 0.
Model with continuous ages. We now move from two ages to a continuous age space and introduce an age 
dependent probability. The model is described as follows. Particles can be in one of the two states, up or down. 
The state of each particle has associated a persistence time defined as: τi = t − ti, where t is the current time and 
ti is the time when the current state of particle i was acquired. The system evolves by randomly selecting a pair of 
particles that, if they are in different states, with probability pi → j particle j adopts the state of particle i, otherwise 
(with probability 1 − pi → j), i copies the state of j. If the particles are already in the same state, no change is applied. 
After N updates, time t is increased to t + 1. The probability pi → j depends on the persistence times τi and τj as
( )τ τ
=
+ /
.
( )
α→p
1
1 2
i j
j i
Initially, each particle has randomly assigned one of the two states and the initial persistence times τi are 
uniformly distributed proportionally to the system size N. We consider random mixing where each particle is 
allowed to interact with any other particle. The case α = 0 corresponds to an updating probability of pi → j = 0.5 
which leads to voter model dynamics16. Large positive values of the exponent (α → ∞) correspond to situations 
in which the particle with the initial oldest state, i.e., the initial largest persistence time, is imposing her state. For 
large negative values (α → − ∞), the state of the particle with the current youngest state, i.e., the shortest persis-
tence time, is imposed.
We first examine the absorbing states of the system. For α → ∞ the system ends up in the oldest state while for 
values of α ∈ (− ∞, 0] the system adopts any of the two states with equal probability. For α ∈ (0, ∞) the probability 
that the system adopts the initial oldest state grows with increasing α and it tends to 1/2 when N increases.
We define the magnetization of the system ( ) = ∑ ( )−m t N S ti i
1  where Si(t) takes value + 1 if the particle i is at 
time t in state up and − 1 if the particle is in state down. The state of the system at time t is defined as 
ρ(t) = 〈 (m(t) + 1)/2〉 , where 〈 ⋅ 〉 denotes average over independent realizations. From ρ(t), the probability density 
function of the system is computed during the simulation period of T = 107 Monte Carlo steps. Figure 2 shows the 
probability distribution function of the states of the system ρ as a function of α. For α = 0, the distribution of 
states is homogeneous corresponding to a uniform distribution of the states. For α negative but close to zero, the 
dynamic is concentrated around ρ = 0.5, which corresponds to a configuration where the particles alternate 
between any of the two states. This situation changes gradually to a more homogeneous distribution of states as α 
becomes more negative. For α > 0, the states are concentrated close to ρ  0 and ρ  1 showing that the system 
eventually orders in one of the two states (the presence of the two peaks is due to the random initial conditions).
Figure 3 shows the ordering time SN(α), i.e., the time that the system needs to reach a final state where all the 
particles have the same state, computed as the median of the distribution of ordering times from different simu-
lations and rescaled to the value SN(α = 0). SN(0) increases linearly with the N as it does for the voter model9,46. For 
values α > 0, SN(α) gets smaller than SN(0) implying that the system orders faster than in the voter model. There 
is a transition when α crosses zero. For values α 0, SN(α) increases very fast with N. This is in agreement with 
the observed dynamics around α = −1 (see Fig. 2). The inset of Fig. 3 shows the scaling with system size of SN(α) 
Figure 2. Probability density function (codified as a color map) of the dependence of the states of the 
system ρ with α. The probability density function of the states is averaged over 105 realizations. The system size 
is fixed to N = 100.
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in the limits: i) α = + ∞ corresponding to the case where, when confronting two states, the oldest state always 
induces the change, and ii) α = − ∞ where the youngest state always induces the change. For α = + ∞ the ordering 
time scales as SN ~ Nγ with the exponent γ = 1.2. In the other limit, for α = − ∞, the ordering time scales as SN ~ N 
exp(bN) with b = 0.009.
In the regime α < 0, what is the behaviour of the system during the long ordering times? Figure 4(a) shows 
time series of the magnetization of the system m(t). For α negative and sufficiently far from zero, the magneti-
zation oscillates around zero. Figure 4(b) provides further analysis by the autocorrelation functions of the mag-
netization time series. The onset of oscillations is observed when α passes a value around − 0.5 from above. 
Figure 4(c) shows the frequency ω and decay constant γ extracted from least squares fits to the autocorrelation 
functions. These values do not exhibit significant dependence on system size. The decay constant is maximum 
at the onset of oscillations, i.e. where the frequency ω becomes non-zero. Both the onset of oscillations and the 
decay behaviour are captured by the basic model, cf. Fig. 1(b). At the transition to non-zero imaginary parts 
(oscillations), the stability of the symmetric fixed point solution (S3) is maximal, meaning that perturbations 
decay fastest.
To understand further the dynamics around α = 0 we define a quantity called the convincingness z. Let S+, 
S− ∈ [N] be the two sets of particles with equal states within each set and different states across sets. We define the 
convincingness of S+ vs. S− as the probability z that the interaction of a uniformly random pair of an S+ particle 
and an S− particle leads to adoption of the S+ state,
∑ ∑
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τ τ
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+
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∈ ∈+ −
z S S
3i S j S
i
i j
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In case α < 0, there are competing effects governing the dynamics of z. When i ∈ S+ convinces j ∈ S−, i) the set S+ 
gains another member who now has the youngest state increasing z. ii) The set S− loses a member j with τj typi-
cally larger than average, making states of S− members younger on average decreasing z. iii) With time advancing, 
all states age by the same additive rate. This makes ratios between ages smaller, driving z towards 1/2. In the case 
α ≪ − 1, the first effect dominates. Thus, an initial advantage in z is amplified and the system orders quickly. For 
α ≈ − 1, ordering times are large due to dominance of the second and third effects. In order to verify this idea, 
we numerically record data pairs (z(t), z(t + τ) − z(t)) with τ = 1. Averaging over pairs with the same or similar 
z(t) values, we obtain 〈 z(t + τ) − z(t)〉 as the expected restoring force. The corresponding standard deviation is 
the noise strength at this z value. The restoring force for z is linear around the equilibrium point z(t) = 0.5 while 
the noise strength is mostly independent of z (see Fig. 5). This suggests to picture the dynamics around α = − 1 as 
one-dimensional equilibrium in a hyperbolic potential under state-independent additive noise.
Different real systems display dominance such as in the adoption of innovations4,5 and alternation as in opin-
ion formation dynamics47–49 or economic cycles50. As an example, Fig. 6 shows the electoral results of the govern-
mental elections for United States, United Kingdom, and Canada during several decades51. The determination of 
periods in the unevenly sampled time series for the governmental elections is calculated with the Lomb-Scargle 
method52,53. The Lomb-Scargle periodogram of the binary time series reveals the existence of alternation between 
the political parties, by the presence of prominent peaks well above the noise level (shuffling of the data), with 
periods of 20–30 years in agreement with observations54. This period of time coincides approximately with the 
length of a generation. Although our model is intended to provide support for a mechanism leading to stochastic 
Figure 3. Rescaled ordering time SN(α)/SN(0) versus α for different system sizes. Open symbols stand for 
the median of the ordering time normalized to the median of the ordering time at α = 0. The horizontal black 
line indicates ordering time equal to that of the voter model without age influence (α = 0) and it has been 
added for visualization purposes. Inset: Scaling of the median of SN(α) in the limits α → ∞ (solid symbols) 
and α → − ∞ (open symbols). Solid lines fit respectively SN(+ ∞) ~ Nγ with γ = 1.2 (black) and SN(− ∞) ~ N 
exp(bN) with b = 0.009 (blue). Ordering times in the region α < 0 for N ≥ 100 are not shown because they are 
computationally very expensive in time.
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oscillations, it could also provide information regarding the temporal scales of the process. Figure 4(c) pro-
vides the relationship between the preference of the population for young states, α < 0, and the frequency of the 
Figure 4. Oscillations and decay of correlations for the finite-size model in the regime α < 0. (a) Excerpts 
from time series of the magnetization for two different values of α, system size N = 50000. (b) Autocorrelation 
functions from magnetization time series of length T = 105, system size N = 50000. (c) Oscillation frequency 
ω (curves with symbols) and decay coefficients γ (no symbols) extracted from time series under different 
values of α and N. Curves for different system sizes N are almost indistinguishable. From the autocorrelation 
function A(τ), frequency ω and decay coefficient γ are obtained from a least squares fit of the functional form 
Afit(t) = exp(− γt)cos(ωt) in the range τ ∈ [0, 100].
Figure 5. Average restoring force on convincingness z following Hooke’s law over a wide range. Data pairs (z(t), 
z(t + 1)) are recorded at times t ∈ {1, 2, …, 106} in a system with N = 200 particles and two states initially assigned 
with equal probabilities and homogeneous initial ages hi = 0 for all i ∈ [N]. Inset: Noise strength as the standard 
deviation for the corresponding z values σ ( + ) − ( ) = 〈 ( + ) − ( ) 〉 − 〈 ( + ) − ( )〉z t z t z t z t z t z t[ 1 ] [ 1 ] 12 2 .
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oscillation. In the range α ∈ [− 0.2, − 1] the frequency expands in the range ω ∈ [0.05, 0.45], that matching the 
period of T = 25 years observed in Fig. 6 allows to resolve the correspondence between the simulation Monte 
Carlo step and the real time to dt = [1.25, 11.25] years respectively. Different mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain political cycles: electorate disappointment55, voters` mood changes54,56, negativity effect57 or policy iner-
tia58. Our study complements those mechanisms by showing that preferential dissemination of recently adopted 
states leads to sustained oscillations at the system level, as exhibited by the regimes ε < − 0.39 in the model with 
four states and α < − 1 in the continuous model.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the competition of states using a basic model that takes into account the aging 
of the state. The stability analysis of the solutions reveals the existence of two stable solutions for positive values 
of the persuasiveness (old state prevails) that compete for consensus. For large negative persuasiveness (young 
state prevails), only one solution is stable leading to oscillatory transients. We have extended our study to a more 
detailed continuous age model finding that, when confronting two states, the final configuration where only one 
state survives and the time needed to reach it is noticeably sensitive to the age of the state through the exponent 
α of the convincing probability. The continuous age model exhibits oscillations exactly as the basic model in the 
corresponding parameter regime, i.e. for sufficiently strong dominance of young states. Our study provides an 
alternative mechanism in the understanding of the dynamics of consensus formation and the observed alterna-
tion between states of different systems. Other works have reported that the increase in the persistence time yields 
to the appearance of an optimal period for which consensus is fastest23,25. In our model, only the preference for 
old opinions leads to the acceleration of the consensus time. As for the alternation between states, in the context 
of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game it has also been observed that the time-dependent learning capacities 
lead to oscillations between cooperator and defector strategies39,40. However, the comparison of the results is not 
straightforward since our model takes into account the competition of states through a probability that depends 
on the persistence times of the interacting particles while in the mentioned references the probability of changing 
the state is affected by the persistence time of only one particle. It would be of interest to explore in the future the 
connection and implications of these two mechanisms in the ordering process and to uncover the general results 
from those related to the specifics of the models. Future developments should include the competition of aging 
states and the aging of agents in structured populations, and the presence of more than two states in the system.
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